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Modern globalization has been a recognized force around the world for
at least three decades. Academic journals, newspapers, television specials,
and political discourse are dominated by globalization events, and their im-
pact seems to be ubiquitous. For most it is a good force, but for a very an-
gry minority it appears to be a bad force. One would have thought that the
terms of a force so important would be well deﬁned, its impact understood,
and its historical evolution appreciated. This hardly seems to be the case, es-
pecially concerning the economic dimensions of globalization, and so this
collection of essays attempts to ﬁll an important gap.
Deﬁning Terms
We should begin at the beginning. What do economists mean by the term
globalization? What is included on their agenda when they debate global-
ization issues? Typically, their agenda is deﬁned by between-country inte-
gration in three markets.
First, there are commodity markets. Here, the debate is about the cause
of trade, the impact of trade, and the political determinants of trade policy.
As for causes, what determines how much is traded between partners? What
are the political, geographic, language, and institutional barriers to trade?
What have been the relative contributions of more liberal trade policies and
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ongoing trade boom is simply due to fast world economic growth since
1950? As for impact, the questions revolve around specialization, structural
adjustment, and distribution. Since the whole point of trade is specializa-
tion, the key question here is which industries advance and which retreat in
the face of foreign competition. Are the trade gains big or small, and how
are they manifested by cheaper and better goods for consumers? How do
economies make the supply-side adjustment? Who gains and who loses?
What happens to resources thrown out of work by the collapse of a domes-
tic industry that cannot withstand the winds of foreign competition, and do
they ﬁnd alternative employment quickly? Do institutions and government
policies tend to minimize the losses by transferring some of the gains from
the winners to the losers? Finally, what about the political determinants of
trade policy? How do constituents communicate to their political represen-
tatives, how do politicians interpret that information, and how do they act
on it? Under what conditions would one expect political backlash to glob-
alization?
Second, there are labor markets. When migration is open and free, who
does the migrating and why? What are the economic and demographic con-
ditions that matter most in source and destination? What impact does the
migration have on the sending and receiving economies? Which residents
gain and which lose with a rise of foreign immigration and domestic emi-
gration? What happens to migration ﬂows when restricted by policy? And
what is the source of the policy restriction? It should be clear that many of
the questions raised about trade and commodity market integration apply
here to migration and labor market integration. Indeed, how do the two in-
teract? Is trade a substitute for or a complement to migration?
Third, there are capital markets, where the same questions apply that
were just posed for labor markets. In addition, however, global capital mar-
ket integration raises even more questions. Here are some: What causes
global capital market crises? Does integration cause contagion between
markets, so that one country’s irresponsible policies spread more easily to
another country, no matter how responsible? Does a globally integrated
world economy ensure that capital ﬂows to poor countries? Do borrowing
countries then lose their ability to control their economies? Alternatively, is
there a “race to the bottom” as countries try to attract more capital by oﬀer-
ing tax advantages and eliminating social welfare programs? Do foreign in-
vestors then extract all the gains, or do the host countries get their fair share?
These are the issues that deﬁne globalization in this volume. We are aware
that this deﬁnition excludes much that also matters. It ignores the trans-
mission of disease by traders, so it cannot speak to the twenty-ﬁrst-century
AIDS/HIV epidemic sweeping Africa and Asia. Nor can it address the four-
teenth-century European plagues that arrived on ships plying the Asia
trade, or the destruction of ﬁfteenth- and sixteenth-century native Ameri-
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little attention to the transmission of technology, and thus may miss one of
the more important determinants of modern economic growth. It ignores
any environmental damage thought to be the result of globalization. It fails
to value any loss of native language and culture thought to be the result of
globalization. We do not assert that these events are unrelated to globaliza-
tion, or that they are unimportant. We simply think that, as economists, we
are better equipped to resolve the other issues ﬁrst.
History Matters
The essays in this volume take the long view. Globalization is not a new
phenomenon. It pays to seek explanations that can account for more than
just global events since 1950; they should also explain global events between
1820 and 1914, and even during the three centuries after Columbus and da
Gama started their voyages from the Mediterranean. The long view has an-
other value: The impact of globalization simply cannot be assessed over a
year, a decade, or even two. Furthermore, if we fear that the violent politi-
cal reaction to globalization seen recently in Seattle, Ottawa, Gothenberg,
and Genoa might cause a political retreat from liberal policy, then it would
pay to look carefully at the twenty years or so before World War I. Then,
under popular pressure, immigration restrictions were passed eventually by
both houses of the United States Congress, and tariﬀs were on the rise al-
most everywhere in the economies of the periphery and also in parts of the
core. It would also pay to look carefully at the interwar years when the
world moved sharply away from openness and toward self-suﬃcient au-
tarky, with expanded trade protection everywhere, increased barriers to la-
bor and capital mobility, and widespread monetary and ﬁnancial dysfunc-
tion. Presumably, these experiences might speak to the future possibility of
another globalization backlash.
The Papers
The essays in this volume fall into three parts. The ﬁrst asks how the pro-
gress of globalization should be measured. Three chapters document the
extent of market integration across time and space in goods, labor, and cap-
ital markets. The second places this knowledge into a wider context. Two
chapters look at the relationship of globalization to the convergent and di-
vergent outcomes that have occurred within and between nations. Diver-
gence having been the more predominant outcome, two more chapters look
globally at the nonuniformity of technological eﬃciency and the agglomer-
ative forces of economic geography. The third part of the book examines the
role of the ﬁnancial sector in globalization. These essays explore world ex-
change rate regimes, ﬁnancial development, ﬁnancial crises, and the archi-
tecture of the international ﬁnancial system.
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Ronald Findlay and Kevin O’Rourke (chap. 1) examine ﬁve hundred
years of trade in goods markets to assess the state of integration today in
light of history. Their focus is on intercontinental commodity trade, for this
is the trade that distinguished post-Columbian globalization from earlier
epochs, and it is also the source of the most consistent data with which to
assess changes over time. Volumes of trade and prices of trade goods can
both tell stories about market integration under diﬀerent auxiliary assump-
tions, but here each tells a coherent and complementary story. Trade grew
slowly from 1500 to 1800, and price gaps between markets remained large.
If transport costs did decline then, it was only a little and was likely oﬀset
by the mercantilist bent of the imperial trade regimes.
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries represent a marked break with
the past, when trade’s weight in the world economy scaled new heights and
prices converged dramatically, with the process reaching its ﬁrst crescendo
around 1913. On that basis we can date the globalization of trade as a mod-
ern phenomenon of the last two centuries, a statement that may seem unre-
markable but will stir some controversy among early modern historians.
Perhaps the more remarkable ﬁnding for economists, however, is the sug-
gestion that, after an interwar hiatus, the postwar reintegration may have
brought us to a point where transport cost and tariﬀ barriers together still
impede the ﬂow of goods more than they did on the eve of World War I.
Barry R. Chiswick and Timothy J. Hatton (chap. 2) face a lesser challenge
in trying to convince us that today’s global labor market is less integrated
than its pre-1914 predecessor. Drawing on 400 years of global labor market
history, they focus on the causes and consequences of migration in ﬁve
diﬀerent eras: (a) the migrations of mostly coerced slave and contracted in-
dentured labor between 1600 and 1790; (b) the early free migrations up to
1850; (c) the mass migrations between 1850 and 1913; (d) the cessation of
international migrations during the World Wars and in between; and (e) the
modern era of “constrained” mass migration since 1945.
Opportunities for improving living standards drive the migration deci-
sion. The trick for the analyst, however, is to isolate the economic, social,
and demographic fundamentals that underlie those decisions. Chiswick
and Hatton identify those fundamentals and then note that changes in the
structure of the world economy have radically altered the direction of the
ﬂows since 1945: European outﬂows dwindled, Latin America switched
from destination to source, and new emigrants increasingly ﬂowed out of
Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. The likely complementarity of migration
to globalization in goods and factor markets, and the “permissive” slant
given to policy during times of rapid wage growth and labor scarcity in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), may
explain the recent resumption of ﬂows on a scale not seen since 1914. Even
4 Michael D. Bordo, Alan M. Taylor, and Jeﬀrey G. Williamsonso, the current eﬀorts by rich receiving countries to stem the tide of low-
skilled immigrants—since they pose the greatest threat to domestic in-
equality—are likely to continue. Given the size of global disparities, how-
ever, the OECD is likely to have limited success.
Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor (chap. 3) survey the development
of international capital mobility since the mid-nineteenth century. They
document the long U traced out by the creation of a well-integrated global
capital market by 1914, its collapse during the interwar years, and its resur-
rection since 1970. This description is enhanced by reference to the open-
economy “trilemma” faced by policymakers when choosing between capi-
tal markets, domestic monetary targets, and exchange rate regimes.
Obstfeld and Taylor examine a wide array of new evidence, including
data on gross asset stocks, interest rate arbitrage, real interest diﬀerentials,
and equity-return diﬀerentials. On all measures examined, the degree of in-
ternational capital mobility appears to follow this U pattern, being high be-
fore World War I, low in the Great Depression, and high today. The debate
over whether global capital mobility is greater today than it was on the
eve of World War I may never be resolved, and no such attempt is made in
the chapter. However, the authors do suggest that world capital may have
ﬂowed more easily to the poorer countries before 1914 than it does today.
Part II: The Great Divergence, Geography, and Technology
J. Bradford DeLong and Steve Dowrick (chap. 4) examine the relation-
ship between the persistence of global disparities and the rising forces of
globalization. Speciﬁcally, they examine inequality in technology, capi-
tal intensity, and per capita incomes at the national level, a place where
enormous gaps have opened up. Although one or another subgroup of
economies has from time to time enjoyed convergence in all these dimen-
sions—notably the poorest countries within the OECD—much of the
world has remained stubbornly outside the process.
Mapping the “convergence club” over two centuries shows how its mem-
bership has changed over time and also how it correlates with the major ups
and downs in globalization. The “great divergence” in incomes that began
with the uneven spread of industrialization in the nineteenth century has
only intensiﬁed on a global scale in the last one hundred years, and nations
today occupy “the most unequal world ever seen.” However, levels and
trends tell diﬀerent stories, and recent positive news, especially from China
and India, suggests that more countries are now closing the gap, or climb-
ing on the “escalator of modern economic growth.” The explanation of
these recent trends is still contested, but the authors conclude that a com-
bination of poverty traps and antigrowth policies held back the poorest
countries, and that openness was a positive but by no means uniform brake
on between-country inequality.
Peter H. Lindert and Jeﬀrey G. Williamson (chap. 5) expand the debate
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inequality. Over the very long run, they ﬁnd no comparable divergence
within countries associated with globalization. At the global level, interna-
tional productivity disparities tell most of the long-run story. They also
show, however, how changing within-country inequality in the short run has
had important political inﬂuences in the past.
The nineteenth century oﬀers some good examples. In the 1840s, the
Anti–Corn Law League found vociferous support from working-class
protests starting on the streets of Manchester. For labor-abundant, land-
scarce European countries, free trade in that era meant cheaper foodstuﬀs
from overseas, and this acted as an income-equalizing force by raising real
wages of the laboring poor while reducing the land rents of the rich aristoc-
racy. Conversely, the trade boom among land-abundant trading partners,
like the United States, raised land rents relative to wages, moving income
distribution in the opposite direction. By analogy we can expect oﬀsetting
movements in within-country inequality in diﬀerent regions of the world at
all times, whether trade is on the rise or not, and this helps us understand
the ﬂat within-country inequality trend worldwide and the important cross-
country tensions it masks. For both proponents and opponents of global-
ization, the importance of the inequality question may depend on whether
one’s egalitarian philosophy stretches beyond one’s national border. Since
open countries seem to grow faster, and since growth seems to be shared
equally among those in poor countries, there is every reason to believe that
globalization is good, and good for the poor, too. However, that conclusion
is strongest where the deﬁnition of global participation is most comprehen-
sive.
Gregory Clark and Robert C. Feenstra (chap. 6) ponder the role of tech-
nology in the “great divergence” between nations. Various factors can com-
bine to cause one country’s level of productivity to be low relative to an-
other: a low capital intensity, a scarcity of other resource inputs, or a low
level of technology. Although capital, both physical and human, has been
shown to play a role, the authors place technology at center stage.
Measured by total factor productivity, this factor varies enormously
across countries, and explains most of the dispersion in productivity levels.
Moreover, under assumptions of an open capital market, technological
diﬀerences might also endogenously determine equilibrium capital intensi-
ties, which will also then be lower. Evidence can be adduced from a variety
of sources across the twentieth century to make the case, such as sector
studies of textile mills and railroads. More aggregative studies using trade
ﬂows to reveal the inherent diﬀerences in country-speciﬁc factor produc-
tivity provide independent conﬁrmation, but whereas these diﬀerences are
known to exist, their precise channels of operation and underlying sources
remain mysterious.
Nicholas Crafts and Anthony J. Venables (chap. 7) examine another pos-
sible source of divergence in the world economy, the eﬀect of increasing re-
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homogeneous area of evenly spread industries, inputs, outputs, and in-
comes. Initial conditions, transaction costs, and location matter a great deal
in the new economic geography, and the power of cumulative causation can
generate persistently unequal outcomes.
The authors use this thinking to explore the ﬁrst great era of globaliza-
tion, applying those historical lessons to the present. Looking ﬁrst at the
“Atlantic economy” of the late nineteenth century, they see beneﬁts to ex-
plaining the rise of industry in the New World economies, particularly the
United States, in this framework. Simple classical competitive models can-
not account for the American “overtaking” in industry, which somehow
overcame an initial comparative advantage that favored agriculture in 1800
to create a springboard for overall economic superiority in the “American
Century” after 1900. However, in a new economic geography model—with
monopolistic competition and positive feedback in manufacturing—eco-
nomic scale and size of market are the keys to “Smithian” growth and ag-
glomeration. This model helps us understand the seeming oddities of
changing economic leadership in the short run, and it thus yields deeper in-
sight into patterns of divergence in the long run.
Part III: Financial Institutions, Regimes, and Crises
Peter L. Rousseau and Richard Sylla (chap. 8) explore the links between
domestic ﬁnancial development, domestic growth, and international ﬁnan-
cial market integration. Historical accounts of the Dutch Republic, En-
gland, the United States, France, Germany, and Japan demonstrate that in
each case the emergence of a domestic ﬁnancial system jump-started mod-
ern economic growth. Indeed, using a cross-country panel of seventeen
countries covering the 1850–1997 period, they uncover a robust correlation
between ﬁnancial factors and economic growth that is consistent with a
leading role for ﬁnance, and, moreover, these eﬀects were strongest over the
eighty years prior to the 1930s.
By identifying roles for both ﬁnance and trade in the convergence of in-
terest rates among Atlantic economies in the prewar period, Rousseau and
Sylla show that countries with more sophisticated ﬁnancial systems tended
to engage in more trade and appeared to be better integrated with other
economies. Their results suggest that both the growth and the increasing
globalization of these economies depended on improvements in their ﬁ-
nancial systems.
Michael D. Bordo and Marc Flandreau (chap. 9) focus on international
monetary regimes. They distinguish between the experience of core (ad-
vanced countries) and periphery (emerging countries). Before 1914, the
core adhered to gold, while the periphery either emulated the core or
ﬂoated. Some periphery countries were especially vulnerable to ﬁnancial
crises and debt default, in large part because of their extensive external debt
obligations denominated in core-country currencies. This left them with the
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considerable resources to maintaining an extra hard peg. Although ad-
vanced countries can successfully ﬂoat today, emerging countries that are
less ﬁnancially mature are likely to fear ﬂoating: To obtain access to foreign
capital, they may need a hard peg to core-country currencies.
Thus, the authors emphasize that the key distinction between core and
periphery both then and now with respect to the exchange rate choice is ﬁ-
nancial maturity, making their approach complementary to the growth
ﬁndings in chapter 9. They then develop their ﬁnancial maturity hypothesis
and present narrative evidence for the pre-1914 period of the diﬀerent ex-
periences of core and periphery in adhering to the gold standard and oﬀer
evidence from the past and present that suggests a strong link between ﬁ-
nancial maturity and the exchange rate regime.
Larry Neal and Marc Weidenmier (chap. 10) examine the history of ﬁ-
nancial crisis that accompanied the ﬁrst phase of international ﬁnancial in-
tegration laid out in chapter 8. Using a newly compiled high frequency
database of short-term interest rates in the pre-World War I gold standard
decades, the authors explore the interdependencies between ﬁnancial mar-
kets in both the core and the periphery in periods of ﬁnancial crisis. They
interpret evidence of a weaker response of periphery countries to core-
country shocks as being consistent with the presence of credit rationing.
They test the eﬀects of both increased interdependence that accompanied
globalization and contagion that occurs independent of increased interde-
pendence. They ﬁnd little evidence for contagion in the crisis of 1873, but
more in the crises of 1893 and 1907. They attribute this pattern of contagion
to the presence of implicit capital controls.
Barry Eichengreen and Harold James (chap. 11) review the history of in-
ternational monetary and ﬁnancial reform in two eras of globalization, the
late nineteenth century and the late twentieth century, and in the period in
between. Their narrative is organized around the hypothesis that a consen-
sus on the need for monetary and ﬁnancial reform is apt to develop when
such reform is seen as essential for the defense of the global trading system.
In most periods, the international monetary and ﬁnancial system evolves in
a gradual and decentralized manner, largely in response to market forces.
The shift toward greater exchange rate ﬂexibility and capital account con-
vertibility since 1973 is the most recent and therefore most obvious illus-
tration of what is a more general point.
Throughout the period they consider, there has existed an abiding faith
in the advantages of trade for economic growth, the principal exception be-
ing the 1930s. In contrast, there has never existed a comparable consensus
on the beneﬁts of open international capital markets for stability, eﬃciency,
and growth. It follows that disruptions to capital markets that do not also
threaten the trading system have had less of a tendency to catalyze reform.
They test this hypothesis by confronting it with evidence from major at-
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as the London Economic Conference 1933—to reform the international
monetary system.
Globalization in Interdisciplinary Perspective: A Panel
Following the papers, a round table on the Costs and Beneﬁts of Global-
ization convened, chaired by Peter B. Kenen of Princeton University. Ex-
perts from diﬀerent disciplines were invited to focus their attention on the
themes raised by the conference papers in terms of the following questions:
What are the beneﬁts? What are the costs? Who wins and who loses? And
what does the future look like?
The ﬁrst panelist was Clive Crook, an editor of The Economist. Crook
considered the possibility that globalization would be reversed by political
forces in the advanced countries the way it was after 1914. He expressed
concern that popular and political opinion had considerable support for the
current crop of protestors. He discussed the fears, imaginary and real, that
were capturing the popular imagination to some extent. These included
falling real wages for the unskilled, general concern over economic security,
and sympathy with the erroneous belief that globalization raises poverty in
the Third World and undermines the capacity to pay for the welfare state.
According to Crook, the evidence does not support most of these concerns.
However, government oﬃcials do not generally acknowledge this evidence.
Indeed, many have expressed sympathy for such views, oﬀering inappropri-
ate support for the proponents of political backlash.
Gerardo della Paolera, rector of Universidad Torcuato di Tella in Buenos
Aires, reﬂected on the conference from the perspective of Argentina and
other countries that are in transition toward opening up to the global trad-
ing and ﬁnancial system. Della Paolera feels that it is crucial to understand
the forces producing stop-go in those countries exploiting globalization as
they try to catch up on the leaders. Thus, he makes a case for more research
on the institutional development and political economy of globalization to
understand why reforms became truncated and why such countries are led
to import institutions wholesale from more successful countries.
Niall Ferguson, a historian at Jesus College, Oxford, considered some big
issues not directly addressed by the conference papers. He argued that al-
though the conference covered the ﬂows of goods, labor, capital, and tech-
nology there was no discussion on the ﬂows of knowledge, institutions,
culture, and political systems. He stressed the importance of political glob-
alization and its many dimensions, including the crucial role of empires and
warfare in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century globalization experience.
Ferguson noted that the global spread of democracy in our time has led to
political fragmentation, civil wars, and corruption—forces that may act to
impede globalization.
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tary Fund, reﬂected on the role of postwar U.S. economic policy in setting
the stage for the last two decades of globalization. From World War II on-
ward, policies toward developing countries that led to many successful out-
comes were based on a consensus between cold warriors and humanists.
This consensus has broken down with the end of the cold war, and Krueger
worries about the inﬂuence of U.S. spokesmen and spokeswomen on the
eﬀectiveness of international ﬁnancial institutions, nongovernmental or-
ganizations, and others who believe that globalization is hurting the poor
countries. Krueger also contrasted the pre-1914 globalization era with the
present one. For example, she argues that although the success of Germany
in the pre-1914 era relied much less on access to the global economy, today’s
stars, as is illustrated by South Korea, have relied extensively on an open
trading system to achieve rapid growth since the 1960s. Also in comparison
to the earlier era of globalization, the high rates of per capita growth today
in countries like Korea considerably minimized the losses borne by the
groups of globalization losers.
Finally, Ronald Rogowski, a political scientist from the University of
California, Los Angeles, assessing directly the costs and beneﬁts and iden-
tifying the winners and losers. The beneﬁts are global, whereas the costs are
local. The key losers in today’s advanced countries are unskilled workers.
They are aﬀected adversely by technological change, by international trade,
by migration, by capital ﬂows to emerging countries, and by their greater
exposure to exogenous shocks. According to Rogowski, these are the
groups that are increasingly turning to the political system in Europe and
America to try to stop the global advance. However, he concludes that glob-
alization in the advanced countries will not be derailed by such forces be-
cause median voters are net winners, and policies to compensate the losers
will continue to be important.
Rogowski argues that the forces creating a divergence between winners
and losers stressed in the conference—local economies of scale, human
capital accumulation, technological change—may not be as important as
bad institutions and bad policies. The fact that some major less developed
countries, like China and India, are changing these policies raises hope for
the future.
An Assessment
This book reveals just how much we now know about the globalization
process, and it is impressive. It also reveals how much morewe need to learn
about the interaction of politics and economics. The better we understand
the political economy of globalization, the better armed we will be to antic-
ipate any future globalization backlash. History need not repeat itself if we
understand the mistakes of the past.
10 Michael D. Bordo, Alan M. Taylor, and Jeﬀrey G. Williamson